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FLAG DESECRATION STATUTES:
HISTORY AND ANALYSIS
ALBERT M. ROSENBLATT*
Since the turn of the century, almost forty decisions have been writ-
ten in appeals involving violations of United States flag desecration
statutes. The distribution of these cases, by decade, provides some
striking features to lawyers, sociologists, and political scientists. Al-
though almost every state has prohibited, for many years, various forms
of flag abuse, almost three-fourths of these matters have been litigated
within the last four years. The period of time around Pearl Harbor
produced four such cases, but in the 25 year period, from 1942-1967,
while flag desecration statutes were found among the laws of virtually
every state, only one such case appeared.
For the most part, the flag cases have been associated with periods
of national fervor, emotion, and, more recently, controversy of a polit-
ical sort.
Under the greatly expanded doctrines of free speech or "symbolic"
speech, violators of these statutes have come to seize upon flag dese-
cration as a most dramatic means of exhibiting contempt for national
policies and beliefs, and as a proven method of infuriating those to
whom the flag is a symbol of profound national pride. The next sev-
eral years will be a severe test for these laws upon the battlegrounds of
patriotism and dissent, and will determine the viability of measures
which seek to regulate those acts and expressions.
* District Attorney of Dutchess County, New York; B.A., University of Pennsyl-
vania, 1957; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1960.
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Contempt for the flag, or protest against American institutions, de-
pending on one's point of view, has been manifest in an extraordinary
variety of acts including burning,' painting,2 and tearing.8 Some pros-
ecutions or actions have been launched against defendants for lowering
the flag;4 subordinating it,5 superimposing "peace symbols",, or slo-
gans7 upon it, or displaying it improperly on one's vehicle."
Individuals have been prosecuted for wearing the flag as a vest,9 a
shirt,10 a poncho,"' a cape,' 2 and for publishing depictions of the flag
used to cover the private parts of an otherwise nude female.'8 It has
been enlisted by defendants who sewed flag patches to the seats of their
pants,' 4 by one who, to dramatize what he termed an aggressive na-
tional policy, displayed the flag in the form of a male sexual organ,";
and by another who wore it as his only article of clothing when ap-
pearing at the draft board.'
1. Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1968); Sutherland v. DeWolf, 323 F. Supp.
740 (S.D. Ill. 1971); Crosson v. Silver, 319 F. Supp. 1084 (D. Ariz. 1970); United
States v. Ferguson, 302 F. Supp. 1111 (N.D. Cal. 1969); People v. Burton, 27 N.Y.2d
198, 316 N.Y.S.2d 217, 265 N.E.2d 266 (1970); Deeds v. State, 474 S.W.2d 718
(Tex. Crim. App. 1971); State v. Turner, 78 Wash. 2d 276, 474 P.2d 91 (1970).
2. People v. Verch, 63 Misc. 2d 477, 311 N.Y.S.2d 637 (Ct. of Spec. Sess.
1970).
3. Joyce v. United States, 259 A.2d 363 (D.C. Ct. App. 1969); Hinton v. State,
223 Ga. 174, 154 S.E.2d 246 (1967).
4. Hinton v. State, 223 Ga. 174, 154 S.E.2d 246 (1967); Lapolla v. Dul-
laghan, 63 Misc. 2d 157, 311 N.Y.S.2d 435 (Sup. Ct. 1970).
5. Hodsdon v. Buckson, 310 F. Supp. 528 (D. Del. 1970).
6. Long Island Vietnam Moratorium Comm. v. Cahn, 437 F.2d 344 (2d Cir.
1970), aj'g on other grounds, 322 F. Supp. 559 (E.D.N.Y. 1970); State v. Nicola, 182
N.W.2d 870 (N.D. 1971); State v. Liska, 26 Ohio Misc. 9, 268 N.E.2d 824 (Mun. Ct.
1970).
7. Commonwealth v. Janoff, 439 Pa. 212, 266 A.2d 657 (1970), rev'g 215 Pa.
Super. 160, 256 A.2d 874 (1969).
8. Parker v. Morgan, 322 F. Supp. 585 (W.D.N. Car. 1971).
9. People v. Cowgill, 274 Cal. App. 2d 923, 78 Cal. Rptr. 853 (1969), appeal
dismissed, 396 U.S. 371 (1970).
10. Hoffman v. United States, 445 F.2d 226 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'g 256 A.2d
567 (1969).
11. State v. Waterman, - Iowa -, 190 N.W.2d 809 (1971).
12. State v. Saionz, 23 Ohio App. 2d 79, 261 N.E.2d 135 (Ct. App. 1969).
13. People v. Van Rosen, 13 Ill. 2d 68, 147 N.E.2d 327 (1958); People v. Keough,
61 Misc. 2d 762, 305 N.Y.S.2d 961 (County Ct. 1969).
14. Cole v. Gray Graybeal, 313 F. Supp. 48 (W.D. Va. 1970); State v. Van Camp,
6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 609 (1971).
15. People v. Radich, 26 N.Y.2d 114, 308 N.Y.S.2d 846, 257 N.E.2d 30, aff'd by
an equally divided court, 401 U.S. 531 (1970).
16. Commonwealth v. Sgorbati, 49 Pa. D. & C. 2d 173 (Ct. Comm. Pl. 1970).
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While the acts which have been held to constitute flag desecration
are many, there is little variance in the state statutes. New York's Gen-
eral Business Law1 is a standard enactment, whose precursor 8 was the
17. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 136 (McKinney 1968):
Any person who: a. In any manner, for exhibition or display shall place
or cause to be placed, any word, figure, mark, picture, design, drawing, or
any advertisement, of any nature upon any flag, standard, color, shield or en-
sign of the United States of America, or the state of New York, or shall ex-
pose or cause to be exposed to public view any such flag, standard, color,
shield or ensign, upon which after the first day of September, nineteen
hundred and five, shall have been printed, painted or otherwise placed, or to
which shall be attached, appended, affixed or annexed, any word, figure,
mark, picture, design, or drawing, or any advertisement of any nature, or
b. Shall expose to public view, manufacture, sell, expose for sale, give
away, or have in possession for sale, or to give away, or for use for any
purpose, any article, or substance, being an article of merchandise, or a
receptacle of merchandise or article or thing for carrying or transporting mer-
chandise, upon which after the first day of September, nineteen hundred
five, shall have been printed, painted, attached, or otherwise placed, a rep-
resentation of any such flag, standard, color, shield or ensign, to advertise,
call attention to, decorate, mark, or distinguish, the article or substance on
which so placed, or
c. Shall print, engrave, or otherwise place or cause to be printed, en-
graved or otherwise placed on any blank check, bill head, letter head, en-
velope or other business stationery, a representation of any such flag, stand-
ard, color, shield or ensign, or shall use any such blank check, bill head,
letter head, envelope or other stationery for business purposes or correspon-
dence, or
d. Shall publicly mutilate, deface, defile, or defy, trample upon, or cast
contempt upon either by words or act, or
e. Shall raffle or place in pawn any such flag, standard, color, shield
or ensign, or
f. Shall publicly carry or display any emblem, placard or flag which casts
contempt, either by word or act, upon the flag of the United States of Amer-
ica, or
g. Shall publicly use or cause any such flag, standard, color, shield or
ensign, to be publicly used as a receptacle for the placing, depositing or
collecting of money or any other article or thing,
Shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
The words flag, standard, color, shield or ensign, as used in this section,
shall include any flag, standard, color, shield or ensign, or any picture or
representation, of either thereof, made of any substance, or represented on any
substance, and of any size, evidently purporting to be, either of, said flag,
standard, color, shield or ensign, of the United States of America, or of the
state of New York, or a picture or a representation, of either thereof, upon
which shall be shown the colors, the stars, and the stripes, in any number of
either thereof, or by which the person seeing the same, without deliberation
may believe the same to represent the flag, colors, standard, shield or en-
sign of the United States of America or of the state of New York.
This section shall not apply to any act expressly permitted by the statutes
of the United States of America, or by the United States army and navy
regulations, nor shall it be construed to apply to a certificate, diploma,
warrant, or commission of appointment to office, ornamental picture, article
of jewelry, stationery for use in private correspondence, or newspaper or
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model for most state statutes. It forbids, in its first section, defacing
of the flag, by placing upon it words, marks, advertisements, or the
like. The statute then prohibits affixation of the flag on articles of
merchandise, or business documents. The heart of the statute is con-
tained in subdivision (d). It fixes criminal responsibility on anyone
who "shall publicly mutilate, deface, defile, or defy, trample upon, or
cast contempt upon either by words or act . . . ."19 The statute em-
braces the United States "flag, standard, color, shield or ensign," or any
representation thereof. By the language of the statute, "flag" is not
limited to an accurate representation, but includes what would rea-
sonably appear, without deliberation, to be the national flag, irrespec-
tive of the number of stars or stripes.
Certain exemptions are set forth, including its use on official docu-
ments, private stationery, newspapers, jewelry, and ornaments. A vio-
lation of the statute is a misdemeanor.
New York's statute has, except for punishment provisions, under-
gone no amendment of any substance since 1905. When first enacted
it provided for a punishment of up to thirty days, with or without a
fine of up to $100. Twelve years later its misdemeanor status was
preserved, but the possible punishment was omitted. Thus, under New
York's present Penal Law, conviction carries punishment of up to one
year20 plus a fine of up to $1,000.21
The Uniform Flag Law22 postdated the New York flag statute; the
two are virtually identical in language. The Uniform Law, which has
periodical, on any of which shall be printed, painted or placed, said flag,
standard, color, shield or ensign disconnected and apart from any adver-
tisement.
The possession by any person, other than a public officer, as such, of any
such flag, standard, color, shield or ensign, on which shall be anything
made unlawful at any time by this section, or of any article or substance or
thing on which shall be anything made unlawful at any time by this section
shall be presumptive evidence that the same is in violation of this section,
and was made, done or created after the first day of September, nineteen
hundred five, and that such flag, standard, color, shield or ensign, or article,
substance, or thing, did not exist on the first day of September, nineteen
hundred and five.
18. Law of May 16, 1905, ch. 440, 1 [1905] N.Y. Laws 973.
19. N.Y. GE~r. Bus. LAw § 136(d) (McKinney 1968).
20. N.Y. PmrL LAw § 55.10(2)(B), § 70.15(1) (McKinney 1967).
21. N.Y. PNAL LAw § 55.10(2)(B), § 80.05(1) (McKinney 1967).
22. The Uniform Flag Statute, 9B McKINNEY'S UNIFoRM LAws ANN. 48.
§ 1. Definition.-The word flag, standard, color, ensign or shield, as used
in this act, shall include any flag, standard, color, ensign or shield, or copy,
[Vol. 1972:193
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been adopted in a number of states, was approved in 1917 by the Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. It ap-
pears that most of the flag law legislation occurred about the time of
World War I. Interestingly enough, the early flag cases, few as they
were, involved not mutilation or symbolic speech desecration, but im-
proper use of the flag for purposes of advertising merchandise or trade-
marks.
Prior to that time it was not the least bit uncommon to observe the
flag affixed to commercial goods, much in the same way as heraldic
picture or representation thereof, made of any substance or represented or
produced thereon, and of any size, evidently purporting to be such flag,
standard, color, ensign or shield of the United States or of this state, or a
copy, picture or representation thereof.
§ 2. Desecration.-No person shall, in any manner, for exhibition or
display:
(a) place or cause to be placed any word, figure, mark, picture, design,
drawing or advertisement of any nature upon any flag, standard, color, en-
sign or shield of the United States or of this state, or authorized by any law
of the United States or of this state; or
(b) expose to public view any such flag, standard, color, ensign or shield
upon which shall have been printed, painted or otherwise produced, or to
which shall have been attached, appended, affixed or annexed any such word,
figure, mark, picture, design, drawing or advertisement; or
(c) expose to public view for sale, manufacture, or otherwise, or to sell,
give or have in possession for sale, for gift or for use for any purpose, any
substance, being an article of merchandise, or receptacle, or thing for hold-
ing or carrying merchandise, upon or to which shall have been produced or
attached any such flag, standard, color, ensign or shield, in order to adver-
tise, call attention to, decorate, mark or distinguish such article or substance.
§ 3. Mutilation.-No person shall publicly mutilate, deface, defile, defy,
trample upon, or by word or act cast contempt upon any such flag, standard,
color, ensign or shield.
§ 4. Exceptions.-This statute shall not apply to any act permitted by the
statutes of the United States (or of this state), or by the United States
Army and Navy regulations, nor shall it apply to any printed or written
document or production, stationery, ornament, picture or jewelry whereon
shall be depicted said flag, standard, color, ensign or shield with no design or
words thereon and disconnected with any advertisement.
§ 5. Penalty.-Any violation of Section Two of this act shall be a mis-
demeanor and punishable by a fine of not more than dollars.
Any violation of Section Three of this act shall be punishable by a fine of
not more than dollars, or by imprisonment for not more than
-. days, or by both fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the
Court.
§ 6. Inconsistent Acts Repealed.-All laws and parts of laws in conflict
herewith are hereby repealed.
§ 7. Interpretation.-This act shall be so construed as to effectuate its
general purpose and to make uniform the laws of the states which enact it.
§ 8. Name of Act.-This act may be cited as the Uniform Flag Law.
§ 9. Time of Taking Effect.-This act shall take effect days
after
Washington University Open Scholarship
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symbols are today. After a few vigorously contested proceedings,
United States flags were no longer seen on beer cans, cigar labels, or
other commercial items. After a lapse of some 50 years, during which
such flag "advertising" was taboo, commercial use of the flag has been
cautiously re-emerging, having its reincarnation in the form of political
bumper strips and billboards, containing the flag, or a facsimile, and
the candidate's name or picture.
ADVERTISING
The first reported case of flag use in a commercial setting was Ruh-
strat v. People.23 Ruhstrat was prosecuted and convicted for display-
ing the national flag on cigar boxes. One of the cigar labels was a pic-
torial representation, with a female head in the center and a picture of
the American flag in the upper left hand comer. Another contained
the likeness of the explorer, Nansen, in the center of a wreath, around
which an American flag was entwined. Other cigar labels depicted
the flag in the company of Lincoln, and the Capitol building. The
statute24 was directed only against commercial use of the flag. This
legislation, therefore, predated those statutes involving burning, tram-
pling, and similar acts that deal with the communication of an idea, as
opposed to the promotion of a product.
The Illinois court declared the statute unconstitutional as a contra-
vention of provisions concerning privileges and immunities, equal pro-
tection, and due process. By prohibiting the cigar seller from continu-
ing his use of the flag on his labels, the state was, in the words of the
court, depriving this citizen of the right to exercise his calling by arbi-
trarily, and under the guise of police power, passing a law which did
not demonstrably promote the safety or welfare of the society.
The topic had begun to arouse some public discussion, generated
by arrests or threatened arrest of businessmen who had been using the
flag as a registered trademark.25 A Chicago judge, in dismissing a
case against a shirt manufacturer, had this to say:
Wherein is the flag desecrated by making a lithograph or a picture
thereof as a trade-mark? If the common use of the flag is to abate
veneration for it, why did our solons pass a law making it compulsory
23. 185 Ill. 133, 57 N.E. 41 (1900).
24. Laws Ill. 1899, p. 234.
25. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 5, 1899, at 1, col. 3.
[Vol. 1972:193
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1972/iss2/1
FLAG DESECRATION STATUTES
upon those in charge to fly the national emblem from the flagstaff of
every school house?
We need no flag law in the State of Illinois to make men patriotic or to
prevent men from desecrating the flag. Every man in all this land
vies with his neighbor in showing devotion, loyalty, and reverence to
the flag, and it is a reflection upon the names of Illinois's patriot dead
to have enacted such a law.
New York's turn came next.
On July 19, 1900, New York City police chief William S. Devery,
acting under a communication by Manhattan District Attorney Asa Bird
Gardiner, declared that all American flags, whether of cotton, silk,
printed, painted, illuminated in electric lights, or of any other kind
which contain anything in the way of an inscription or advertisement,
will be hauled down by the police department. The order expressly
included campaign banners. Chief Devery stated, however, that the
proclamation does not refer to barber poles which, it was explained, do
not resemble closely enough the national symbol. He did, nevertheless,
refer to certain named products which would fall within the proscrip-
tion of the order, namely, "Yankee Doodle Toothpicks", "Star Spange-
line for the Bath", and a quaint advertisement which promised that
"Uncle Sam Pills cure all Ills".26
Chief Devery's order was issued following his receipt of a letter from
District Attorney Gardiner, who actually authored the legislation. "As
a National Presidential election is approaching," Gardiner wrote, "there
will undoubtedly be many violations of the statute by persons who do
not know of its provisions, but who, upon being informed of the prohi-
bition, will immediately conform. 27
William McKinley and Theodore Roosevelt,28 however, were not to
be denied. During the 1900 presidential campaign their images were
displayed on national flag banners. This writer cannot determine
whether those banners were distributed in New York, but it does seem
clear that the flag had, traditionally, played a prominent part in politi-
cal campaigns at all levels. In striking down the present day version
26. N.Y. Times, July 22, 1900, at 2, col. 6.
27. Letter from Asa Bird Gardiner to Police Chief William S. Devery, July, 1900.
28. When New York's first flag law was enacted the bill was signed by Gov.
Theodore Roosevelt. Law of Feb. 22, 1899, ch. 12, § 1, 1 [1899] Laws of N.Y. 17
[now N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 136 (McKinney 1968)].
Vol. 1972:193]
Washington University Open Scholarship
200 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
of N.Y. Stat. L. 1899, oh. 12, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in
Long Island Vietnam Moratorium Committee v. Cahn,20 made men-
tion of these earlier practices, and referred to the appendix of defend-
ant's brief, which contained a duplication of the McKinley-Roosevelt
campaign banner.
New York's 1899 flag statute, which contained a provision essen-
tially the same as existing Gen. Bus. Law § 136 in 1903 when Jacob H.
McPike, manager of an established cigar business, was arrested for
selling cigars, whose boxes, manufactured in Pennsylvania, contained
representations of the flag upon them. The cigar boxes bore a "Betsy
Ross" label and the flag was depicted beneath a medallion of Betsy
Ross, and, in another place, the flag was shown carried by American
soldiers in action.
After McPike's arrest and incarceration, the Appellate Division, by
a divided court, reversed Special Term and granted habeas corpus, on
the ground that the statute, by prohibiting the use of the label, uncon-
stitutionally deprived McPike of a property right. "It was," the court
said, "competent for the Legislature to make it a misdemeanor to pub-
licly mutilate, deface, defy, defile, trample upon, or cast contempt,
either by word or act, upon the National or State flag, and mutilation
of the flag may mean the printing of an advertisement on the ensign
itself. Such legislation is within the police power of the state, for it re-
lates to the preservation of the peace."" ° But the portion of the statute
under which McPike was arrested unjustly discriminated against busi-
nessmen, and in the court's view, was not defensible under the doctrine
of police power. The Court of Appeals affirmed,31 upon much nar-
rower ground:3 1 the unconstitutional application of the statute to
articles lawfully in existence at the time of its passage. Following
the Court of Appeals decision, the statute was cured (L. 1905, oh.
29. 437 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1970).
30. People ex rel. McPike v. Van De Carr, 91 App. Div. 20, 26, 86 N.Y.S. 644,
648 (1904).
31. People ex rel. McPike v. Van De Carr, 178 N.Y. 425, 70 N.E. 965 (1904).
32. An affirmance on narrower grounds nullifies the lower court decision only to
the extent that it is not in conflict with the higher court. Thus, the Appellate Divi-
sion decision would be fully binding within its own department, e.g., Sullivan v. Sulli-
van, 73 N.Y.S.2d 547 (Sup. Ct. 1947), and, because the higher court ignored the
broader issue, open to consideration at a later time. Brown v. Rosenbaum, 175
Misc. 295, 23 N.Y.S.2d 161 (Sup. Ct. 1940), rev'd, 262 App. Div. 136, 28 N.Y.S.2d
345 (1st Dept. 1941), afj'd, 287 N.Y. 510, 41 N.E.2d 77 (1942), cert. denied, 316
U.S. 689 (1942).
[Vol. 1972:193
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440) by limiting its application to possession after September 1, 1905.11
The Appellate Division decision is interesting from an historical
point of view. Although we cannot discern how many members of the
majority, if any, smoked Betsy Ross cigars, it is clear that they were
not the least bit offended by the depiction of the flag on the cigar box.
On the contrary, they considered it patriotic:
The government of the United States has not prohibited the use of
the flag in connection with advertisements. Trade labels, of which a
representation of the national ensign forms a part, are accepted at
the patent office, as appears upon the face of one of the labels an-
nexed to the complaint in this matter. Such trade marks and labels
have been of common use. "National flags are sometimes blended with
other objects to catch the eye. They are admirably adapted to all
purposes of heraldic display, and their rich glowing colors appeal to
feelings of patriotism, and win purchasers of the merchandise to which
they are affixed. * * * One flag printed in green may catch the eye
of the son of the Emerald Isle; * * * another flag, with stars on a blue
field and stripes of alternate red and white, may secure a preference
for the commodity upon which it is stamped." (Browne Trade-Marks
[2d ed.] § 265.) There is nothing in the use of a representation of
the American flag as a trade mark or in connection with a trade mark or
trade label that inspires the idea that that flag is degraded or belittled.
On the contrary, the remark of Mr. Browne would seem to indicate
the real situation, namely, that their rich glowing colors appeal to feel-
ings of patriotism. 34
The issues at the time were much more precise. The thornier con-
cept of freedom of speech was not to appear until some years later.
For example, McPike's argument in the Court of Appeals did not touch
upon any such lofty principles, but was confined to technical constitu-
tional arguments dealing with the doctrine of property rights, the com-
merce clause, and the exclusiveness of Federal regulatory powers. The
People's brief in the Court of Appeals makes much of the right of the
state government to enact legislation for the protection of the flag as
a means of stimulating patriotism, protecting public displays, and sup-
porting the military powers of the state. The People argued that the
use of the flag for advertising purposes was an act of degradation and
profanation over which the Federal government did not possess ex-
33. Law of May 16, 1905, ch. 440, 1 N.Y. Laws 973 (1905) (repealed 1965).
34. People ex rel. McPike v. Van De Can, 91 App. Div. 20, 27-28, 86 N.Y.S. 644,
649 (1904).
Vol. 1972:193]
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clusive cognizance. Not a word was written concerning the first
amendment issues of free speech.
In a parellel situation the Supreme Court of Massachusetts upheld a
conviction for violating a statute forbidding the use of the great seal
of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts for advertising or commercial
purposes.35 The Massachusetts high court held that the defendant's
use of the great seal on business labels could be prohibited by the
state. The court distinguished McPike on the ground that the Massa-
chusetts statute specifically did not apply to articles manufactured be-
fore passage of the act. Ruhstrat was distinguished on the ground that
that case turned on the absence of any national legislation restricting
the use of the flag.
Any possible claim as to the powers of the state to prohibit the use
of the flag for purposes of commercial advertising was positively set
to rest in the landmark case of Halter v. Nebraska.6 Halter, like Mc-
Pike, was a businessman who had been selling items, in this case, beer
and whiskey, whose bottles contained labels depicting the United States
flag. Halter was prosecuted and convicted in Nebraska under a statute
which closely resembled New York's law. Using the customary ap-
proach of the day, Halter argued that jurisdiction and control of the
national flag has always been vested in the federal government and
that the field is not amenable to divided jurisdiction. In the same tech-
nical vein, the defense asserted that congressional powers to regulate
the use of the flag is exclusive and that the failure of Congress to make
express regulations indicates its will that the subject shall be left free
from any restrictions or impositions.
As in McPike, the broader issues of freedom of speech were latent;
indeed the defense agreed that ". . . we apprehend that in all places
where the flag is displayed by the sovereign power of the nation, the
executive arm of the government has power to protect the flag in time
of peace as well as in time of war, even to the killing of the person or
persons who might haul it down, should it become necessary to resort
to such harsh means.1137 This truly extraordinary statement is descrip-
tive of the lack of any concern about the use of the flag for purposes
of politics, dissent, or what has been termed symbolic speech.
35. Commonwealth v. R.I. Sherman Mfg. Co., 189 Mass. 76, 75 N.E. 71 (1905).
36. 205 U.S. 34 (1907), affg 74 Neb. 757, 105 N.W. 298 (1905).
37. Remarks of counsel cited unofficially in 51 L. Ed. 696, 698 (1907).
[Vol. 1972:193
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The United States Supreme Court could have simply affirmed the
conviction by upholding the portion of the statute concerning adver-
tising, without passing on the provision dealing with mutilation, tram-
pling, and contempt. But the Court chose to address itself to the stat-
ute in its entirety and upheld the statute, and with it, approved the
right of any state to legislate on the subject. The decision was clearly
bottomed upon the interest of the government in protecting the flag
from degradation, disgrace, or contempt, and that by this means, na-
tional partriotism and affection for the flag stood to be enhanced.
The following portion of Justice Harlan's opinion epitomizes the at-
titude of the high court:
So, a state may exert its power to strengthen the bonds of the Union,
and therefore, to that end, may encourage patriotism and love of coun-
try among its people. When, by its legislation, the state encourages a
feeling of patriotism towards the nation, it necessarily encourages a
like feeling towards the state. One who loves the Union will love the
state in which he resides, and love both of the common country and
of the state will diminish in proportion as respect for the flag is weak-
ened. Therefore a state will be wanting in care for the well-being of
its people if it ignores the fact that they regard the flag as a symbol
of their country's power and prestige, and will be impatient if any
open disrespect is shown towards it.38
The Court in Halter held that the use of the flag for commercial
purposes tends to degrade and cheapen it in the estimation of people,
and that the interdiction applies to the use of the flag as an advertise-
ment on a beer bottle. The court similarly rejected any claim that Hal-
ter's property rights were abridged by simply saying that the flag is not
a subject over which one can acquire a property right and, in any
event, its use is subordinate to the government's police powers.
Halter, decided in 1907, is still the most frequently cited flag case
and represents the sole occasion that a majority of the United States Su-
preme Court has spoken on the merits. Following Halter the various
states began to enact legislation in the spirit of the New York and Ne-
braska statutes. Of all of the state statutes extant today, only a few
words differentiate one from another. Instances of advertising, and the
decisions of state courts applying the facts to the law, have periodically
been litigated since the Halter decision. In 1942 the New York Court
of Appeals affirmed a conviction for violating the then existing Penal
38. Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U.S. 34, 42 (1907).
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Law § 1425(16) which prohibited the placing of any advertising upon
the flag. 9 In an affirmance without opinion, the court, citing Halter,
applied the statutory proscription to the operator of an automobile on
which an American flag was painted. The flag contained an advertise-
ment for a travel service, and the court rejected the defendant's equal
protection argument.
The Attorney General has the authority and responsibility of render-
ing opinions concerning matters involving interpretation of various stat-
utes. Accordingly, Attorneys General have had occasion to offer legal
opinions to perplexed citizens who were contemplating the use of the
flag and were fearful of prosecution. In New York, for example, the
Attorney General was queried as to whether it would be unlawful to
cover any part of the flag by picture or other printed matter when de-
picted in a magazine.
He rendered an opinion ° pointing out that the statute is designed
to protect the national emblem from desecration and commercial ex-
ploitation and that it is not unlawful to represent the flag in a newspa-
per or periodical disconnected or apart from any advertisement. Three
years before that the Attorney General's office rendered an opinion 41
discouraging the use of the flag in an advertisement of a business, to be
used in connection with Flag Day, 1940. The flag was to appear in
the newspaper above the words "God Bless America", as sponsored by
a business firm.
Other state Attorneys General have encountered similar problems.
For example, the Kentucky Attorney General opined 42 that a statutory
violation would occur if the American flag was used as a designated
symbol of a political group on the ballot; that it would constitute a
form of advertising prohibited by Kentucky statute. Similarly, the Iowa
Attorney General rendered a decision43 declaring that it would be im-
proper for a bank to include a depiction of the flag in an advertisement
in which the bank proposed to give away a United States flag to per-
sons opening a savings account. Again, in 1916 the Iowa Attorney
General suggested4 4 that the use of the stars and stripes by a moving
39. People v. Picking, 288 N.Y. 644, 42 N.E.2d 741, affg 263 App. Div. 366,
33 N.Y.S.2d 317 (1942), aff'g 23 N.Y.S.2d 148 (1940).
40. 1943 N.Y. Att'y Gen. Rep. 90.
41. 63 N.Y. Att'y Gen. Informal Op. 127 (1940).
42. 1959 Ky. Att'y Gen. Op. 43, 847.
43. 1916 Iowa Att'y Gen. Rep. 73.
44. 1916 Iowa Att'y Gen. Rep. 219.
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company would be a statutory violation, pointing out that such a rep-
resentation would be unlawful, irrespective of the color, or number of
stars or stripes to be used.
Distinctions, of course, have always been made between commercial
use and private use of the flag. The use of a flag on a letterhead has
always been considered lawful. 5
The Louisiana Attorney General, under a statute containing lan-
guage which parallels the New York law, reached exactly the opposite
result as his New York counterpart when he advised one writer that
there was no objection to depicting the flag on goods offered for sale
when the same is not used as a trademark or for advertising purposes46
and again when the Louisiana office ruled that no provision in their
Act would prevent a company from selling the United States flag or
from displaying an illustration of the flag in advertising the same.47
This ruling is precisely contrary to the one made in New York.48
The shifting emphasis and the enforcement of flag statutes undoubt-
edly reflect public attitudes. The genesis of the flag legislation gener-
ally took place during the early part of this century, when the politici-
zation of the flag was virtually unknown.
Insults against the flag usually involved degradation or cheapening
in the form of advertising. Curiously, a situation has now developed
in which physical acts of desecration and destruction of the flag have,
to some degree, been protected by the first amendment, whereas the
very type of advertising at one time felt to be patriotic, is still pro-
hibited. A bold advertiser occasionally represents the flag on an item
of goods offered for sale, but the decisions have had the odd effect of
licensing the more demonstrable acts of contempt for the flag while
restraining those most easily restrained, namely, the business commu-
nity. Thus, flag burners have frequently taken refuge in the bill of
rights; flag advertisers have not.
After the decisions in Halter, Sherman, McPike, and Ruhstrat, flag
advertising generally subsided and a new species of flag litigation
emerged. About ten years after Halter the first appellate decision ap-
peared involving a prosecution for flag contempt.49  Not surprisingly,
45. 1916-18 La. Att'y Gen. Rep. & Op. 851.
46. 1934-36 La. Att'y Gen. Rep. & Op. 515.
47. 1938-40 La. Att'y Gen. Rep. & Op. 411.
48. 63 N.Y. Att'y Gen. Informal Op. 127 (1940).
49. State v. Shumaker, 103 Kan. 741, 175 P. 978 (1918).
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this case occurred during the first world war. By this time a great
many states had begun to enact provisions making it a crime to "cast
contempt, either by words or act, upon the United States flag." This
was the basis of the prosecution in Shumaker. Indeed, following the
court of appeals decision in McPike, New York amended its statute
to include this very language.
Shumaker's conviction could not possibly survive the appellate proc-
esses today. His conduct involved no act of physical desecration or
mutilation, but consisted merely of using contemptuous words about
the flag, in the presence of others. The Kansas Supreme Court found
the language contemptuous of the flag and affirmed the conviction.
Two years later the first federal court decision involving flag con-
tempt was decided. 50 The defendant was convicted, under a Montana
statute, for uttering "contemptuous and slurring" language about the
flag. His language was as follows:
What is this thing anyway? Nothing but a piece of cotton with a little
paint on it and some other marks in the comer there. I will not
kiss that thing. It might be covered with microbesA'
Tried and convicted, Starr was sentenced to the Montana State Peni-
tentiary for a term of 10 to 20 years hard labor.
The federal district court denied habeas corpus in spite of its find-
ing that the sentence was "horrifying," and that Starr was intimidated,
by a crowd, into making the utterance. In a decision marked by its
literary references to the Inquisitition, Salem, St. Bartholomew, heresy
hunters, witch burners, French, English, German courts, and George
Bernard Shaw, the Court found the state law valid and the imprison-
ment "not repugnant to the Federal constitution. '52
In retrospect, and with all of the confidence of hindsight, one could
identify a decision such as this as generating the sort of thinking which
has produced the paradoxes of this day.
In the period between World War I and World War II, no reported
flag case arose. Pearl Harbor produced a national intensity that re-
sulted in more litigation on this subject. It is, of course, not unnatural
that the country should look to the national symbol during times of in-
ternal or international stress. A necessary concomitant of nationality
50. Ex parte Starr, 263 F. 145 (D. Mont. 1920).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 147.
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is the selection of a national symbol or flag, and its importance in de-
veloping a sense of loyalty to a national entity is without question.
Thus, a United States District Court noted:
Countries and movements of whatever political persuasion adopt a
banner in their incipient stages because of its psychological impact upon
those who would serve in their behalf. Our own country was no excep-
tion to this fundamental rule during the early efforts of the Constitu-
tional Congress to forge a union, the Congress, less than one year after
declaring its independence, provided on June 14th, 1777, that "the flag
of the United States be thirteen stripes, alternate red and white, that the
Union be thirteen stars, white in a blue field, representing a new con-
stellation.53
It was not until 1967 that the Congress concerned itself with the
enactment of a national flag statute. Up until that time the matter was
left exclusively to the states. Congress had, nevertheless, in 1942, en-
acted legislation dealing with those patriotic customs which include flag
etiquette.54 It thus appeared that the Congress was content to leave
criminal enforcement entirely to the states while setting down certain
suggested guidelines to promote national respect for the flag. Signif-
icantly, the chapter including these provisions is entitled "Patriotic Cus-
toms," thereby confirming the view that the matter of criminal en-
forcement was to reside with the states. At the outset of the enact-
ment of this federal law, arguments were made asserting that any acts
associated with the flag, whether criminal or otherwise, are exclusively
within the domain of the Federal Government. No court has ever
adopted this view." Ironically, the cases decided during the Pearl
Harbor era produced decisions which, because of their extreme hold-
ings, weakened the foundations of flag statutes generally. For ex-
ample, the Arkansas statute contemplates, as does New York's, con-
tempt by word or act. Upon a prosecution for words alone the Ar-
kansas Supreme Court affirmed a conviction for a purely verbal insult
to the flag.5"
The Supreme Court of Maine, in the same year, reversed a conviction
based on oral utterances directed against the flag,57 only because the
53. United States v. Ferguson, 302 F. Supp. 1111, 1114 (N.D. Cal. 1969).
54. 36 U.S.C. §§ 170-86 (1971).
55. It was rejected flatly in People v. Von Rosen, 13 IlM. 2d 68, 147 N.E.2d 327
(1958).
56. Johnson v. State, 204 Ark. 476, 163 S.W.2d 153 (1942).
57. State v. Peacock, 138 Me. 339, 25 A.2d 491 (1942).
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words were not spoken publicly. In State v. Schleuter0 s New Jersey's
Supreme Court upheld the conviction of a young woman who tore and
crumbled an American flag and threw it to the ground. She evidently
did so in an effort to persuade a group of men that she was a Nazi.
In the late 1960's a new and enormous body of flag law emerged,
bringing into play legal doctrines that affect the core of a free society. It
called into question the reasons surrounding the very existence of
these laws.
PATRIOTISM, NATIONAL WELFARE, AND PUBLIC ORDER
After the United States Supreme Court reversed itself in West Vir-
ginia Board of Education v. Barnette5" by overruling Minersville School
District v. Gobitis,0 it became clear that the advancement of patriot-
ism, by statutory enactment, was not a constitutionally approved gov-
ernmental objective. Barnette, of course, involved a compulsory flag
salute, which, as a coerced expression of respect, is quite different from
a voluntary gesture of contempt. But the government, in dealing with
attitudes of citizens toward the flag, was about to undergo its first real
crisis. The distinction has remained generally intact: the government
cannot extract positive declarations, but may prohibit certain physical
acts, even though the subject matter happens to be the same.01
From the point of view expressed in Barnette it is manifest that the
judiciary, or at least that portion of it which has sought to uphold the
flag statutes, has justified these laws on the safest ground remaining,
namely, the police power as it involves the prevention of disruptions.
It may be seen at a glance that this was not the design of the authors
of these statutes. The laws were clearly examples of pride in the flag,
and evinced a desire to avoid its cheapening at a time when flag burn-
ing and the public disruptions that surround such acts, were all but
unheard of. To be sure, affronts to the flag have always been a source
of belligerencies. But the Halter Court settled any doubt as to the true
purposes of these statutes:
58. 127 N.J.L. 496, 23 A.2d 249 (1941).
59. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
60. 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
61. The dichotomy between words and acts is as old as the Constitution itself.
Any restraint on the former, absent compelling factors, introduces the most time
honored guarantees of free speech, much in the same way as the distinction between
beliefs and practices in religious affairs. 2 T. JEFFERSON, WRINGs 300-03 (Monti-
cello ed.). See also 7 WRITiNGS OF GRORGE WASHiNGTON 13 (Ford ed. 1890).
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As the statute in question evidently had its origin in a purpose to
cultivate a feeling of patriotism among the people of Nebraska, we
are unwilling to adjudge that in legislation for that purpose the state
erred in duty or has infringed the constitutional right of anyone. On
the contrary, it may reasonably be affirmed that a duty rests upon each
state in every legal way to encourage its people to love the Union
with which the state is indissolubly connected.62
Sixty years after Halter the courts are now struggling to sustain the
constitutionality of statutes after the rationale for their enactment has
been all but repudiated. Four courts have refused to do so and the
statutes have there been declared facially unconstitutional.63
The court in Parker v. Morgan made this comment:
: * * Enacted in 1917 during a period of national chauvinistic fervor,
it is an uncommonly bad statute. Despite our respect, and indeed love,
for these symbols of state and nation, we are compelled to hold the
statute unconstitutional. 64
Of course, other cases have declared the statute to be unconstitutional
as applied, a topic which will be covered below. In Crosson v. Silver the
court specifically rejected the existence of a "constitutionally recognized
state power to prohibit flag desecration based on an interest in preserving
loyalty or patriotism." 65 It did, however, recognize that the state has
substantial interest in preventing the kind of public disorder that could
attend flag desecration. Nevertheless, the court struck down the stat-
ute because it was drawn to include within its prohibition acts of a type
that would not predictably cause public disruption.
The same legitimacy of purpose was noted in Long Island Vietnam
Moratorium Committee, wherein the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
invalidated much of New York's statute which proscribed the placing
of any mark on the flag (here, a "peace symbol") on the grounds that
the subsection was not designed to deter onlookers from doing unlaw-
ful acts.
Other courts have echoed words found in Halter urging that "insults
to the flag have often been the cause of war, and indignities put upon it
62. Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U.S. 34, 43 (1905).
63. Long Island Vietnam Moratorium Comm. v. Calm, 437 F.2d 344 (2d Cir.
1970); Parker v. Morgan, 322 F. Supp. 585 (W.D.N.C. 1971); Crosson v. Silver,
319 F. Supp. 1084 (D. Ariz. 1970); Hodsdon v. Buckson, 310 F. Supp. 528 (D. Del.
1970).
64. 322 F. Supp. 585, 586-87 (W.D. N.C. 1970).
65. 319 F. Supp. 1084, 1087 (D. Ariz. 1970).
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in the presence of those who revere it, have often been resented, and
some times punished on the spot." 60  In reliance upon this language
the court, in Cowgill, upheld the statute on the basis of the states' inter-
ests in preserving public order. The Illinois Supreme Court in Von
Rosen placed its holding on the same grounds, as did the New York
Court of Appeals in Radich despite Judge Gibson's statement that the
cultivation of patriotism, rather than the fear of public disorder was the
dominant legislative purpose.67
Certainly, that is the case. The American Bar Association approved
the uniform flag law in a report that leaves no doubt as to the purpose
of the legislation. The following language appears in the report ac-
companying the approval of the law:
We cannot refrain from noting the exceeding timeliness of the pro-
posed legislation. The flag is the symbol of sovereignty, and at no time
has the sovereignty of this government been so assertive and conspicu-
ous, in the place which it occupies in the sun which lights the world.
It is essential to the maintenance of its power and prestige among the
nations of the world, that it shall be respected among the peoples at
home, and that the insidious encroachments of treason which strike at
the symbol and at the sovereignty symbolized, shall be speedily and
effectively suppressed, to the end that this nation, self-respecting and
respected, shall, with the other forces of righteousness, with which it is
now allied, secure that, "peace which passeth (the) understanding," of
the German lords, and over-lords, who know no peace, save that of abject
subjection to the tyranny of force.68
The United States District Court for the Delaware District, in Hod-
sdon, also perceived a dual purpose in the statute: protecting the na-
tional symbol through the encouragement of patriotism, as well as the
prevention of breaches of the peace, but held that the statute struck
indiscriminately where no interest was served other than curtailment
of nonverbal expression. The United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia took a somewhat more generous view, recognizing
the interest of government in protecting the flag from desecration, but
reversed a conviction for wearing a flag as a vest, holding that this
was not the sort of contempt envisioned by the statute.69
66. Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U.S. 34, 41 (1905).
67. People v. Radich, 26 N.Y.2d 114, 119, 257 N.E.2d 30, 34, 308 N.Y.S.2d 846,
850 (1970).
68. Report of the Comm. on Uniform State Laws, 4 A.B.AJ. 527, 528 (1918).
69. Hoffman v. United States, 445 F.2d 226 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'g 256 A.2d 567
(1969).
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It thus appears that some shift in judicial reasoning has been taking
place. In the early cases, the statute was defended essentially on pa-
triotic grounds, e.g., Halter, Johnson, Shumaker, but by Barnette's
time, the doctrine of public disorder gained prominence as the founda-
tion upon which the constitutionality of these statutes rested.
While some courts still regard the enhancement of patriotism, or
the development of a sense of loyalty to a national entity, as a per-
fectly sufficient justification for the statute,70 other courts have aban-
doned reliance upon this purpose in favor of the less lofty and more
easily defensible grounds of public peace and the prevention of violent
disturbances. In light of Street v. New York 71 such a retreat is not
surprising. The Supreme Court, in reversing a conviction for flag
burning on the grounds that the jury may have convicted Street for
uttering the contemptuous words that accompanied the act, said the
following:
Finally such a conviction could not be supported on the theory that
by making . . . remarks about the flag appellant failed to show the
respect for our national symbol which may properly be demanded of
every citizen .... 7-
While this may be read, as did the court in Crosson, as eliminating
flag respect as a basis for prohibiting physical as well as verbal desecra-
tion of the flag, it need not be so expanded. The course that is most
consistent with Street, and does least violence to the true history and
purpose of the statute, is the one which recognizes that the flag laws
spring fundamentally from a desire to protect the national symbol,
while at the same time, preventing outbreaks of disorder resulting from
physical acts of abuse. This duality of purpose was acknowledged not
only in Radich, but in other post-Street cases, including Sutherland
and Van Camp.
In order for the statutes to become operative, public acts of desecra-
tion are contemplated. This means that preservation of the national
symbol is not the sole object of the law. For if it were, the word
"public" could be safely read out of the statute. It seems clear then,
that the statute is designed to do more than simply gain control of
70. United States v. Ferguson, 302 F. Supp. 1111 (N.D. Cal. 1969); Deeds v.
State, 474 S.W.2d 718 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971).
71. 394 U.S. 576 (1969), rev'g 20 N.Y.2d 231, 229 N.E.2d 187, 282 N.Y.S.2d
491 (1967).
72. Id. at 593.
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men's minds. While the statutes may have been devised to elevate the
national symbol, it was done with the knowledge that this very spirit
of national ardor would be the basis of a breach of the peace were the
flag to be publicly desecrated. Consequently, some courts have endeav-
ored to discern whether a particular act was "public" or "private"
within the meaning of the statute.
DESECRATION-PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
At the beginning of the second world war, two cases appeared in
which contempt for the flag was exhibited in the presence of a small
number of people. The consideration confronting appeals courts, in
reviewing the judgments of convictions, was the issue of whether the
act was public in nature. In Shumaker, the defendant was in a black-
smith shop in Nemaha County, Kansas, when he was heard to utter in-
decent language about the flag. The court did not print the language
used, but described it as vulgar, holding that:
• . . In response, it must be said that it is hard to conceive of language
that would express greater contempt for the flag of the United States
than that used by defendant. Such language will not, cannot, be used
by any man in any place concerning our flag, if he has proper respect
for it. The man who uses such language concerning it either in jest
or in argument, does not have that respect for it that should be
found in the breast of every citizen of the United States. Such language
concerning our country's flag will not be used except for the purpose
of casting contempt upon it.73
The court made no mention of the number of people present in the
blacksmith shop when the utterance was made, but held that a black-
smith shop is a place to which the people of the community resort for
the purpose of having machinery and tools repaired and ironwork done,
and is therefore a public place within the meaning of the statute.
In Peacock, the defendant in Plymouth, Maine on June 13th, 1940,
was heard to say:
What is the flag anyway? It is nothing more than a piece of rag.
If I had an American flag here now I would strip it up and trample
it under my feet. 4
He then moved his hands in front of him as though he were tearing
an object and pretended to then stamp on it with his feet. This di-
73. State v. Shumaker, 103 Kan. 741, 742, 175 P. 978, 979 (1918).
74. State v. Peacock, 138 Me. 339, 341, 25 A.2d 491, 493 (1942).
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atribe occurred in the complainant's home in the presence of another.
The court, without considering the first amendment, held that the
statute was designed to prevent that which would shock the public
sense, because the publicity accompanying acts of flag desecration
would be likely to result in breaches of the peace. If, therefore, the
words were spoken in the privacy of one's home, albeit in the presence
of two other people, the utterance is not within the ambit of the statu-
tory proscription. The court refused to adopt the contention of the
state that anything done or said in the company of others is "public".
It thus becomes clear that acts of contempt for the flag must be, if
prosecutable, of a sort that would predictably result in public disorder.
Whether there was such a disturbance is quite beside the point.
It is axiomatic that crime, even in the privacy of one's quarters, is,
in the words of the United States Supreme Court, of grave concern to
society, and the law determines such crime to be reached upon proper
showing. 7 But while this may be true as a general principle, some
behavior may be rendered criminal merely because of its public char-
acter, such as the common law crime of affray, and the crimes of riot,
disorderly conduct, and the like.
It is difficult to guess what the Maine Supreme Court would have
done had these words been uttered publicly. Today such utterances
would be wholly protected under the first amendmentf 6 but this has
been a relatively new doctrine.
A similar instance occurred in Arkansas in June of 1941. Joe
Johnson was convicted in a lower court in Searcy County, Arkansas,
for verbally abusing to the flag at a welfare commissary in Marshall,
Arkansas. The conviction was appealed to the state's highest court,
77
where it was noted that Johnson was charged with violating the statute
when he got into an argument with someone in charge at the com-
missary after being asked to salute the flag in order to dispel a rumor
that he was unpatriotic. He refused to do so, saying that he would
die before he would and that:
You can't get anything here unless you salute the flag. It don't have
eyes and can't see and has no ears and can't hear, and no mouth
and can't talk.... It doesn't mean anything to me. It is only a rag.78
75. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
76. Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969).
77. Johnson v. State, 204 Ark. 476, 163 S.W.2d 153 (1942).
78. Id. at 478, 163 S.W.2d at 153-54.
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This exchange occurred in the presence of a large number of people
in the commissary at the time. The Arkansas court, over the dissenting
opinion of its chief judge, affirmed the conviction and expressed its
displeasure with defendant in the following admonition:
It seems to us that it would be difficult to imagine a state of facts
under which contempt for the flag could be more convincingly demon-
strated in public than in the circumstances here. The strange and un-
natural conduct of this man at the very time he was receiving, from
the hands of a most generous government, supplies to aid him in sus-
taining a large family, may not be explained away on the grounds of
ignorance or religious beliefs. It is one thing to be given the privilege
of refusing to salute the flag, but quite another when one by word or
act publicly exhibits contempt for the flag. Here appellant after re-
fusing to salute the flag, as was his privilege, proceeded to address a
large number of people and tell them than [sic] the flag meant nothing
to him and was only a "rag". Webster's dictionary defines "rag" as
"A waste piece of cloth torn or cut off, a shred or tatter, something re-
sembling or suggesting a rag or rags and considered of little worth or
service;-used contemptuously, jocularly, or ironically as of a flag,
newspaper, etc." We think appellant's statement clearly evinces con-
tempt for the flag within the terms of the statute in question. 79
The court gave no attention to any first amendment issue but at-
firmed the conviction, rejecting Johnson's contention that he was fol-
lowing the biblical admonition prohibiting the paying of homage to
earthly objects. This decision is perhaps the product of an attitude
prompted by our involvement in a conflict with a foreign power.
In Radich the exhibit in which the flag was represented in the form
of a male sexual organ was displayed on the second floor of a Madison
Avenue art gallery. The New York Court of Appeals held that the
exhibit was public despite the contention that it was an art form in the
quiet surroundings of the upstairs art gallery. The court did not deal
specifically with this issue, although it was mentioned in the dissent.
The majority ostensibly based its holding on the fact that the so-called
artistic construction was in a display window.80
ExPRESSION
The first amendment is couched in terms of freedom of speech,
79. Id. at 481, 163 S.W.2d at 154.
80. People v. Radich, 26 N.Y.2d 114, 119, 257 N.E.2d 30, 32, 308 N.Y.S.2d 846,
851 (1970).
[Vol. 1972:193
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1972/iss2/1
FLAG DESECRATION STATUTES
not freedom of action. The framers of the Constitution believed that
a free society could be expected to flourish through the communica-
tion of ideas-a possibility most readily achieved by means of speech,
either verbal or written. A deed, as opposed to a spoken or written
word, may, with equal effectiveness, convey an idea, but there is far
greater risk that a deed will produce additional results. For example,
one may wish to demonstrate dissatisfaction with the Selective Service
by writing a letter to a newspaper editor. The same thought may be
conveyed, to put an extreme case, by executing the director of Selective
Service or, in diminishingly drastic means, by destroying the building,
destroying the records, or by merely blocking access to the building.
These acts, although they all may be intended as a means of expres-
sion, affect not only the minds of third persons, as do mere utterances,
but the safety, limbs, and even lives of others, much in the same way
that a person may be endangered by a fire from an automobile burned
as a protest against vehicular pollution. Thus if any act is such that
it might pose a predictable danger to another, it cannot be afforded
governmental protection, and, indeed, merits governmental sanction.
Any statute which attempts to inhibit thought, speech, or expres-
sion, is not acceptable unless it is limited to prohibiting conduct that
may affect the persons or properties of others. It follows, therefore,
that the restraint to be placed upon conduct must be no greater than
is necessary to meet the government's interest of protecting others not
from the impact of an idea, but from the direct consequences of the
act itself. Of course, there are instances in which the government
may curtail speech, as in the case of "fighting words" which would
produce a riot,81 or noise which assaults one's privacy, 82 but as a rule
it is not speech, but expressive acts that have presented the most per-
plexing challenges to the first amendment.
This brings us to a discussion of what may be a clear case of ex-
pression-flag burning-in which third persons are endangered not
by the act itself, but by the conduct which it predictably provokes.
It is, one would suppose, possible to argue that flag burners have
not produced riots, but that they merely burn the flag while others
riot. If, for example, the American-Nazi party applied for a permit
to conduct a parade adjoining the picnic grounds of the American Le-
81. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
82. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, rehearing denied, 336 U.S. 921 (1949).
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gion or the Jewish War Veterans, the proponents of the permit would
be heard to assert that their parade is protected by the first amend-
ment and that any violence would necessarily be ignited by unreason-
able people who are given to violence. Similarly, one who undertakes
a public act of flag burning may foreseeably incite the outbreak of vio-
lence by others. In this context, one can hardly ignore the wide-
spread tendencies on the part of most Americans to be outraged by
such a public act. If, as Justice Harlan noted in Halter, wars have been
inaugurated because of assaults upon the flag, one cannot totally set
aside human nature and ignore the possibility of the outbursts which
it will promote. And if, as Justice Harlan and Judge Gibson wrote, in-
sults to the flag have been the cause of large-scale hostilities, a legislature
might well find that one may cause a panic, in a crowded place, by
burning a flag as well as by shouting "fire".83
Nor should "actual disturbance" be the test. If any act is likely to
provoke a breach of the peace, such an act may properly be prohibited.
The reasons for this are three-fold:
By prohibiting acts which may produce violence or a breach of the
peace, the government deters both these acts and, proportionately, a
smaller number of outbursts that the acts may produce.
Secondly, it is appropriate for the government to set certain stand-
ards of conduct in order to guide members of the community as to
those acts that ought to be punished.
Finally, an act of flag desecration, with no resulting violence, is
similar to an act of driving while intoxicated with no ensuing accident.
Drunk driving is to be discouraged because the possibility of danger
increases when drivers are drunk, much in the same way that certain
anti-social acts may result in violence.
This reasoning parallels the rationale applied in cases of disorderly
conduct or breach of the peace, in which the actual occurrence of a
breach of the peace is not relevant. In those instances, criminality is
not made to depend on the reaction of another to a defendant's con-
duct, but on the objective nature of the conduct itself.8 4 In New
York convictions for breaches of the peace have been sustained even
83. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
84. People v. Harvey, 307 N.Y. 588, 123 N.E.2d 81 (1954).
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where no actual breach occurred, but when defendants engaged in
behavior of the sort proscribed by the statute. 85
The distinction between "words" and "deeds" would seem to pro-
vide a ready formula for the application of the first amendment. The
distinction, however, blurs at the first difficult hypothetical. If the test
were measured by so simple a rule of thumb, one who silently stuck
his tongue out at the flag would be within the teeth of the statute, un-
able to gain shelter under the first amendment's speech guarantee.
Similarly, one who performed obscene gestures or thumbs one's nose
at the flag would be guilty of acts of non-verbal contempt. Yet, no
free society could abide a statute that allows the incarceration of an in-
dividual who failed to show proper reverance for the flag. And so the
first amendment has stood as a defense against statutes that make
punishable forms of conduct that are not, strictly speaking, "speech"
but which, nevertheless, clearly involve expression or communication.
The last prosecution for flag abuse by word alone occurred in 1942.
Incredible as it seems, the first amendment was never mentioned by
any court during the years that purely verbal abuse to the flag resulted
in convictions. When expression took other forms, the first amend-
ment arguments began to develop. Thus, the first amendment, hav-
ing been dormant during prosecutions for verbal flag abuse, has been
steadily advanced, under the theory of symbolic speech, in resisting
prosecutions for burning flags, both physically,"6 and by depicting the
burning of a flag on a magazine cover.87  It has also been advanced
in defense of prosecutions for superimposing upon it peace symbols,88
and the words "make love not war."89 Hoffman, Cowgill, Van
Camp, and Waterman sought its protection when arrested for wearing
the flag as an article of clothing, as did Joyce for tearing it, Verch for
painting it, and Radich for draping it in the form of a male sexual
organ. Keogh, Von Rosen, Parker, and Hodsdon also contended that
their treatment of the flag was designed to communicate an idea.
The United States Supreme Court has made it abundantly clear that
speech and expression are not unconditionally protected, but are sub-
85. People v. Squires, 135 Misc. 214, 238 N.Y.S. 151 (Ct. Spec. Sess. 1929);
People v. Yergan, 164 Misc. 83, 299 N.Y.S. 248 (City Magis. Ct. 1937).
86. See note 1 supra.
87. Korn v. Elkins, 317 F. Supp. 138 (D. Md. 1970).
88. See note 6 supra.
89. Commonwealth v. Haugh, 439 Pa. 212, 266 A.2d 647 (1970), rev'g 215 Pa.
Super. 160, 256 A.2d 874 (1969).
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ject to reasonable regulation upon compelling state or federal interests.
Although a minority of the Court has been of the view that the first
amendment literally prohibits any restraints upon speech, 90 even Mr.
Justice Black would distinguish between "pure" speech and conduct
that is said to be "symbolic" speech. Justice Black noted this differ-
ence when, writing for the majority, the Court held that the communi-
cation of grievances by trespatory picketing on jail grounds does not
merit first amendment shelter 1 and when he joined the majority in
generally rejecting the notion that a limitless variety of conduct can be
labelled "speech" whenever the actor intends thereby to express an
idea. 2
Through the years the court has carved out certain well-recognized
exceptions to the absoluteness of first amendment guarantees. It is
obvious that a person is not free to speak encouragement of crime, 3
or to utter in certain contexts "fighting" 94 or explosive words.9 r Sim-
ilarily, obscenity, notwithstanding its varying definitions, is not within
the protection of the first amendment. 6 Plainly put, the view that
the first amendment is limitless "cannot be reconciled with the law
relating to . . . misrepresentation . . . false advertising, conspiracy,
and the like . . . . 7 Other exceptions include libel,08 revolutionary
incitation,"9 criminal syndicalism,100 undue pre-trial publicity, 10 1 dis-
semination of magaznes by uninvited peddlers, 0 2 disclosure of troop
movements, 0 3 raucus sound trucks, 10 4 extrajudicial statements punish-
90. E.g., Mr. Justice Black in Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 476 (1966).
91. Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966), rehearing denied, 385 U.S. 1020
(1967).
92. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).
93. Fox v. Washington, 236 U.S. 273 (1915).
94. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
95. Milk Wagon Drivers, Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U.S. 287, re-
hearing denied, 312 U.S. 715 (1941).
.96. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
97. Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36, 49 n.10 (1961).
98. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952), rehearing denied, 343 U.S. 988
(1952).
99. Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957); Dennis v. United States,
341 U.S. 494 (1951).
100. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
101. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
102. Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
103. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 n.6 (1931), citing Z. CHAIEE, FREE-
DOM OF SPEFCH 10 (1920).
104. Kovacs v. Cooper, 366 U.S. 77 (1949), rehearing denied, 336 U.S. 921 (1949).
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able by contempt if they present a clear and present danger of ob-
structing the administration of justice0 5 or if they are in violation of a
court order restricting pre-trial public discussion. 106 The first amend-
ment has also abided the licensing requirements for outdoor worship 10 7
and has not been extended to protect disruptive conduct in a public
welfare office, even though the conduct was said to be an exercise of
the right to petition and to express grievances. 108 To be sure, the
guarantees have safeguarded the rights to picket peaceably in labor
movements0 9 and social protests, 10 but the expression of speech
through picketing will not be protected if its not peaceful."' More-
over, broadcasting from," 2 or picketing in front of a courthouse is not
protected at all."' Thus, where there is expression combined with
some act that is disruptive of public order, the first amendment will
not be inducted into service, as where an individual positions himself
across a sidewalk, in obstruction of pedestrian movements." 4  Nor is
there any right to monopolize broadcasting frequencies,"15 to speak
interminably on a party line in the face of an emergency," 6 or to en-
gage in unrestrained speech and abusive conduct within a court of
law."17
ART
Artistic expression is embodied within the concept of first amend-
ment guarantees, and as such, is subject to the same protections and
limitations. Accordingly, artistic forms will be inhibited only when
in conflict with some overriding government interest. Obviously, a
105. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
106. United States v. Tijerina, 412 F.2d 661 (10th Cir. 1969).
107. Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395 (1953), rehearing denied, 345 U.S.
978 (1953).
108. Hurley v. Hinckley, 304 F. Supp. 704 (D. Mass. 1970), affd, 396 U.S. 277
(1970).
109. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
110. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965); Shuttlesworth v. Ctiy of Birming-
ham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969).
111. Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460, 464-66 (1950).
112. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965), rehearing denied, 382 U.S. 875 (1965);
N.Y. Crv. RIGHTS Lw § 52 (McKinney Supp. 1971).
113. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965).
114. Bachellar v. Maryland, 397 U.S. 564, 571 (1970).
115. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 387 (1969).
116. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 270.15 (McKinney Supp. 1971).
117. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970), rehearing denied, 398 U.S. 915 (1970).
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visual display, however artistic, may not be used as a means to mali-
ciously libel another"18 or to unlawfully invade one's privacy."10 Sim-
ilarly, a forged painting may well qualify as a work of art, but the artist
could hardly insulate himself from criminal responsibility by invoking
the first amendment. With these principles in mind, some cases of
flag desecration have been adjudicated upon a backdrop of artistic
expression.
In Korn v. Elkins,120 students at the University of Maryland distrib-
uted a student publication which pictured the burning flag on the front
cover. The university officials refused to permit publication of the
issue, and an action was brought by the students challenging this re-
fusal and requesting declaratory and injunctive relief. The court de-
clared the statute unconstitutional as applied, on the ground that there
were no acts other than the creation of the cover illustration and its at-
tempted publication. The court noted that it was not faced with any
intertwining of conduct and expression, but that the case presented ex-
pression only, in the form of art.
The Supreme Court of Illinois was confronted with a similar issue121
following the arrest of the distributors of a magazine which depicted
a young woman who was nude, except for a large hat, sunglasses, and
a piece of cloth, that looked exactly like the United States flag, cover-
ing the pubic area of her body. The court examined the statute, a
standard enactment, and concluded that its chief purpose was to pre-
vent breaches of the peace. The conviction was reversed upon their
holding that the record was devoid of any evidence tending to show
that the publication of this picture was of the sort likely to bring about
the substantive evils the legislature sought to prevent. Art was not
discussed, but inferentially, the case may be construed as authority for
the protection afforded to published material, which, as "pure" speech
is to be distinguished from conduct.
Neither Korn nor Von Rosen involved obscenity. But the concept
of restricting material said to be pornographic, in the face of reliance
118. Brown v. Paramount Corp., 240 App. Div. 520, 270 N.Y.S. 544 (1934); Mon-
son v. Tussands, 1 Q.B. 671 (1894).
119. C. GATLEY, LIBEL AND SLANDER IN A CIVIL ACTION 34 (1953). This concept
was recognized in New York in Schuyler v. Curtis, 40 N.Y. St. Rep. 289 (Sup. Ct.
1891).
120. 317 F. Supp. 138 (D. Md. 1970).
121. People v. Von Rosen, 13 Ill. 2d 68, 147 N.E.2d 327 (1958).
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upon artistic expression, is one that parallels the standards for the en-
forcement of flag desecration statutes as against claims involving the
furtherance of art. In either case, whether it be "flag art", or matter
thought to be obscene, restrictions on expression will occur if the inter-
est of the state or government in attempting to avoid the evil to which
the statute is addressed outweighs the particular expression or act in-
volved. Thus, as in the case of obscenity, a balance of competing
interests occurs, and the courts must decide whether the particular com-
modity is subordinate to the state or governmental interest.
The United States Supreme Court recognized that the "portrayal of
sex, e.g., in art... is in itself insufficient reason to deny material the
constitutional protection of freedom of speech and press.' 12   In so
holding, the Court confirmed the view that artistic exposition is em-
braced within the freedom of speech guarantees under the first amend-
ment.
Radich, upon a prosecution for constructing a flag in the form of
a male sexual organ, contended that this was a work of art, worthy of
free speech guarantees. 123 Indeed, his construction was displayed in a
Madison Avenue gallery. The court of appeals would not, however,
convert what it felt to be a wilful act of flag desecration into protected
art. The case presented special interest because there was more than
"art" involved. Radich asserted that his production was not only an
artistic work, but that it was entitled to further protection on the
ground that it evinced his repudiation of the Vietnamese war. New
York's Court of Appeals has previously rejected an analagous argu-
ment by upholding an "aesthetic" ordinance prohibiting the display of
soiled laundry on a clothesline in the defendant's front yard, despite
the fact that the display was said to be an expression of social pro-
test. 2
4
Radich's fate was thus pre-ordained. Having denied social protest
and art automatic entry into the fortresses of the first amendment, the
court allowed Radich to fare no better, notwithstanding his reliance on
both.
We can look forward to cases in which conduct related to the flag
will be discussed under artistic freedoms within the first amendment.
122. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 191 (1964).
123. 26 N.Y.2d at 117, 257 N.E.2d at 31, 308 N.Y.S.2d at 848.
124. People v. Stover. 12 N.Y.2d 462, 191 N.E.2d 272, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734, appeal
dismissed, 375 U.S. 42 (1963).
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To the extent that these cases parallel the standards used in adjudicat-
ing between obscenity and art, expert opinion would be available on a
flag desecration trial as an offer of proof to establish an overriding
artistic content. 2 - In assessing artistic merit, upon an obscenity pros-
ecution, it is error to refuse expert testimony on the subject. 120  Thus,
if plays, 127 dance, 28 poetry, 29 and other art forms are deserving of
first amendment protection, one can expect expanded reliance upon
the concept of artistry in cases involving representations of the flag.
While art work is entitled to no less protection merely because it may
be primarily intended as a social utterance, 130 a defendant's classifica-
tion of something as "art" is not necessarily entitled to recognition.
Should these issues arise, it is predictable that a defendant would
have an easier time of it were he to photograph or verbally depict flag
desecration than if he were to erect and display a creation of the sort
described in Radich. This would be consonant with the recognized
doctrine that greater freedom is afforded to pure speech, than to people
who act out the expression of a message, as in the case of picketers.' 13
Radich, by mingling that which he termed art with social protest,
was less successful than the purveyor of a publication portraying a
judge sitting on a swastika while masturbating. 32  In resisting an ob-
scenity prosecution, he urged that he was engaging in protected social
criticism. His contention was upheld. Had it been an American flag,
rather than a swastika, the result might well have been different.
In some ways these troublesome issues remind us of the earlier ob-
scenity cases. But just as the United States Supreme Court in Roth
departed from the Hicklin'33 test by examining an allegedly obscene work
"as a whole" rather than by isolating certain of its components,' 34 the
courts will no doubt gradually stabilize standards in separating explo-
sive acts of flag desecration from behavior that chiefly affects our sense
125. United States v. West Coast News Co., 357 F.2d 855, 859 (6th Cir. 1966),
126. Yudkin v. State, 229 Md. 223, 182 A.2d 798 (1962).
127. Dixon v. Municipal Court, 73 Cal. Rptr. 587 (CL App. 1968).
128. In re Giannini, 69 Cal. 2d 563, 446 P.2d 535, 72 Cal. Rptr. 655 (1968).
129. Ginsberg v. City of Miami, 307 F. Supp. 675 (S.D. Fla. 1969).
130. United States v. Head, 317 F. Supp. 1138 (E.D. La. 1970).
131. Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967).
132. Dillingham v. State, 9 Md. App. 669, 267 A.2d 777 (1970).
133. Regina v. Hicklin, [1868] 3 Q.B. 360.
134. See United States v. One Book Entitled Ulysses, 72 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934),
in which the court anticipated this standard by evaluating James Joyce's Ulysses, "as
a whole" and in so doing confirmed its artistic merit.
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of decorum and patriotism. At one time in the not too distant past,
the courts actually found it necessary to write opinions declaring that
Bocciaccio, Arabian Nights, Rabelais, and Ovid were shielded by the
first amendment, 135 just as convictions for verbal affronts to the flag
would now be reversed. To be sure, in exuberant excess, some courts
will go beyond customary limits by seeking, for example, to punish a
person for displaying as an ecology gesture, an American flag manu-
factured with green rather than red stripes, 36 much in the same way
as earlier courts held books like Dreiser's An American Tragedy to be
outside the ambit of the first amendment, obscene, and corruptive
of youth.13 7
But in sum, the standard, in assessing whether a work is "art" or
"desecration", may be adopted from the language of the United States
Supreme Court in Jacobellis v. Ohio:
Use of an opprobrious label can neither obscure nor impugn the Court's
performance of its obligation to test challenged judgments against the
guarantee of the First and Fourteenth Amendments and, in doing so,
to delineate the scope of constitutionally protected speech.' 38
CRIMINAL INTENT OR POLITICAL INTENT?
Once having declared the flag to be a very special symbol, it is not
surprising that it has been adopted as an attention gaining device. By
taking a flag and doing something with it publically, an actor may
subjectively intend any one of a number of things. Whether or not
he intends contempt can, at best, be inferred by his explanation, if any
is given, by the predictable response of onlookers, and by a combina-
tion of surrounding circumstances from which a jury may draw con-
clusions as to the operation of his mind. While a person is deemed
to intend the natural and probable consequences of his act, 39 a split
of authority has arisen: must an individual intend to cast contempt or
is the mere performance of the act, thought by the jury to be con-
temptuous, a sufficient foundation for criminal responsibility.
135. In re Worthington Co., 30 N.Y.S. 361 (Sup. Ct. 1894).
136. New York Daily News, July 24, 1970, at 5.
137. Commonwealth v. Friede, 271 Mass. 318, 171 N.E. 472 (1930).
138. 378 U.S. 184, 190 (1964).
139. Generally, a person is presumed to intend the natural and probable conse-
quences of a voluntary act. 1 W. BURDICK, LAW OF CRIME 136 (1964); People v.
Agron, 10 N.Y.2d 130, 139, 176 N.E.2d 556, 560, 218 N.Y.S.2d 625, 631 (1961).
As to presumptions and inferences relating to intent, see 1 F. WHARTON, WHARTON'S
CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 131 (12th ed. 1955).
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When explanations are offered, few defendants concede any in-
tent to disgrace the flag. In Commonwealth v. Sgorbati,40 the of-
fender appeared at his draft board wearing only an American flag over
a pair of boxer shorts. He professed a love for the country, but oppo-
sition to its war. In another case the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia reversed a conviction for wearing the flag as a shirt.1" 1
The defendant testified that he wore the shirt as a gesture of adherence
to the concepts of the founding fathers. 142  In overturning the convic-
tion the court acknowledged the defendant's purpose by stating:
Considering appellant's testimony as to his political views and ide-
ology, we may well assume that the episode had a distinct flavor of
sarcasm or mockery, with an added element of childishness in his play-
ing with the Yo-Yo, but appellant's performance to his audience did
not include the physical injury to the material of the shirt essential to
be proved beyond a reasonable doubt to support a conviction of the
crime defined in the statute. 143
In another case' 44 the defendant exhorted viewers to "make love not
war" by printing it on the flag. This corresponds with dicta in
Crosson v. Silver where the court observed: ". . . nor in this day
and time is anyone likely to mistake the nature of the ideas expressed
by a young person who desecrates his country's flag at an anti-war
gathering."'14 5 Hinton pulled the flag down in a melee following his
effort to lower the flag to symbolize a state of mourning, during a free-
dom march; 146 Hodsdon147 and Radich' 4s were claiming the displeas-
ure with the war, while Burton 149 was proclaiming displeasure with
140. 49 Pa. D. & C.2d 173 (Ct. Comm. P1. 1970).
141. Hoffman v. United States, 445 F.2d 226 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'g 256 A.2d
567 (1969).
142. * * * I had a shirt that resembled the American Flag. I wore the
shirt because I was going before the Un-American Activities Committee of
the House of Representatives, and I don't particularly consider that committee
American in the tradition as I understand it, and I don't consider that House
of Representatives in the tradition that I understand it, and I wore the shirt
to show that we were in the tradition of the founding fathers of this country,
and that that committee wasn't. That's why I wore it. Id. at 227.
143. Id. at 229.
144. Commonwealth v. Janoff, 439 Pa. 212, 266 A.2d 657 (1970).
145. 319 F. Supp. 1085, 1086 (D. Ariz. 1970).
146. Hinton v. State, 223 Ga. 174, 154 S.E.2d 246 (1967).
147. Hodsdon v. Buckson, 310 F. Supp. 528 (D. Del. 1970).
148. People v. Radich, 26 N.Y.2d 114, 257 N.E.2d 30, 308 N.Y.S.2d 846 (1970).
149. People v. Burton, 27 N.Y.2d 198, 265 N.E.2d 66, 316 N.Y.S.2d 217 (1970).
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Johnson, Humphrey, and Wallace. The flagged peace symbols in
Long Island Vietnam Moratorium Committee, 5 ' Nicola 1  and
Liska1 ' " were essentially political, as was Street's' 5 ' reaction to the kill-
ing of James Merideth, Ferguson's'5 4 flag burning during a rally in
front of the court house, and Deeds's assertion that "government poli-
cies had soiled the flag."' 5
These defendants, unlike others who had "no purpose whatever,"'I5
regard their intent as political as opposed to criminal. The importance
of criminal intent as an element of the crime is thus readily seen.
If the standard were subjective as opposed to treating the statute as one
malum prohibitum, responsibility would be measured from the actor's
viewpoint.15 7  Critical as this issue is, only three courts discussed it,
and they were not unanimous.
The majority in Radich viewed the statute as malum prohibitum,
holding that:
a person with the purest of intentions may freely proceed to dis-
seminate the ideas in which he profoundly believes, but he may not
break a law to do it . . . . Whether defendant thinks so or not,
a reasonable man would consider the wrapping of a phallic symbol
with the flag as an act of dishonor. ..1
The Supreme Court of Washington held differently in State v.
Turner' and reversed a conviction because of the failure of the trial
court to instruct the jury that a verdict of guilty must be predicated
upon a finding that the defendant, notwithstanding his having burned
the flag, intended to violate law, and to defile the flag.
Such a holding, while not declaring the statute unconstitutional, ef-
fectively destroys it. The requirement of scienter must be read into
the statute, the court said, because the offense does not require conduct
150. 437 F.2d 344, 348 (2d Cir. 1970).
151. State v. Nicola, 182 N.W.2d 870 (N.D. 1971).
152. State v. Liska, 26 Ohio Misc. 19, 268 N.E.2d 824 (1970).
153. Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969).
154. United States v. Ferguson, 302 F. Supp. 1111, 1112 (N.D. Cal. 1969).
155. Deeds v. State, 474 S.W.2d 718 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971).
156. E.g., State v. Waterman, - Iowa -, 190 N.W.2d 809 (1971).
157. On the distinction between malum prohibitum and mala in se see F. WHARTON,
WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW AND PROcEDURE 56 (12th ed. 1957).
158. 26 N.Y.2d at 123, 257 N.E.2d at 35, 308 N.Y.S.2d at 852 (1970). See also
State v. Waterman, - Iowa -, 190 N.W.2d 809 (1971).
159. 78 Wash. 276, 474 P.2d 91 (1970). See also Hodsdon v. Buckson, 310 F. Supp.
528, 531 n.2 (D. Del. 1970) (in which the court appears to have held a similar view).
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that would cause disruption or riot.10 This writer questions the logic
by which scienter was judicially engrafted. The court did so on the
theory that it must have been contemplated, because it was omitted.
If Turner is good law, then all "communicative" acts of public flag
burning under existing statutes, would perforce be protected. It thus
seems hardly necessary to reverse on such technical grounds when the
court was actually negating the statute as being incompatible with the
first amendment. If the statute is constitutional-that is, if the gov-
ernment may legitimately proscribe such acts as public flag burning-
an actor's behavior must be assessed by an objective test, with a de-
fendant's personal avowals relevant, but not controlling; otherwise the
statute would be hollow and inoperable.
In discussing standards for criminal intent, one cannot ignore the
standards of enforcement, and the selection of defendants. This is
quite another thing from the doctrine of "unconstitutional as ap-
plied." The latter presupposes a valid statute which, by its terms,
may work unfairly against some people or groups rather than others. 10 1
The selection of defendants, however, is a more subtle phenomenon, in
which the law is applied unevenly not through any statutory infirmity
but by targeting it at a chosen few. An example would be a case of
a "hippie" arrested for wearing the flag upside down, while a "law
and order" candidate, who sports the flag on a campaign poster would
be let alone. The latter case is a clearer violation of the statute which
forbids flag advertising, but the hippie, it is inferred, intends contempt
while the candidate does not. It is a doctrine that activates the equal
protection clause of the Constitution, but not as plainly as in cases like
Halter, where the defendant, a beer distributor, argued that the statute
160. 474 P.2d at 95.
161. New York, may, for example, constitutionally prohibit the use of the flag on
all commercial labels. On its face such a statute seems even handed enough, but
would be unconstitutional as applied to a businessman who stands to lose money after
having purchased such stock in trade, when it was lawful for him to do so. See People
ex rel McPike v. Van De Carr, 91 App. Div. 20, 86 N.Y.S. 644 (1904); Ruhrstat v.
People, 185 Ill. 133, 57 N.E. 41 (1900).
The most recent example of the unconstitutional application of the statute was in
Street, where the conviction was reversed because of the possibility that the statute
permitted Street to be punished "merely for speaking defiant or contemptuous words
about the American Flag." 394 U.S. at 581.
For another instance where the Court held that the flag statute could not be con-
stitutionally applied by University officials to refuse publication of a paper that pic-
tured a burning flag, see Korn v. Elkins, 317 F. Supp. 138, 142 (D. Md. 1970). Pre-
cisely the same result was reached, with regard to the publication in Von Rosen.
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was "class legislation"'1 2 unfair to businessmen who could no longer
use the flag on products.
The Court, in Parker v. Morgan,1 3 made a sardonic reference to the
kind of inconsistencies that these practices connote. Parker wore a
jacket, on which he had sewn the flag with the words "Give peace a
chance" superimposed. He was arrested. The court noted that the
statute was so broad as to amount to the expropriation of color and
design, but that "On the day this case was heard the Charlotte Ob-
server carried a Belk store advertisement in red, white, and blue with
stars. Needless to say, there has been no arrest and no prosecution."' 14
Similarly, flag creations that are manufactured and worn are less
likely to induce arrests than home-sewn articles, presumably, one fears,
because manufacturers are thought to be more respectable than Bohe-
mian handcrafters.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals touched on this point in the
Long Island case, declaring that the statute prohibiting markings on
the flag was too vague to provide officials with standards, thus pro-
moting selective enforcement.
The court said:
Because of its overbreadth, the statute vests local law enforcement
officers with too much arbitrary discretion in determining whether or not
a certain emblem is grounds for prosecution. It permits only that ex-
pression which local officials will tolerate; for example, it permits local
officials to prosecute peace demonstrators but to allow "patriotic" or-
ganizations and political candidates to go unprosecuted. This oppor-
tunity for discriminatory selective enforcement, which § 136(a) provides,
renders the statute unconstitutional.' 16 5
T"E VAGUENESS DOCTRINE
No statute that seeks to punish conduct will survive unless it can be
understood and obeyed.166 If a law lacks criteria sufficient to afford
162. 205 U.S. at 37. See text accompanying notes 23-40 supra. The same argu-
ments, made by the defendants in McPike and Picking were rejected.
163. 322 F. Supp. 585 (W.D.N.C. 1971).
164. Id. at 588 n.3.
165. 437 F.2d at 350.
166. See Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U.
PA. L. REv. 67 (1960); Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 Hnv.
L. REv. 844 (1970).
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comprehension and compliance, it will be invalidated, as impermissibly
vague.167  A great many defendants in flag cases have attacked the
statute on these grounds. In Crosson, Hodsdon, Long Island, and
Parker the argument carried the day. The Supreme Court expressly
declined to pass on the issue;168 two other courts, in declining to pass
directly on the statute's constitutionality, confessed grave doubts about
it.169
The chief ailment of the statute, according to these courts, is its
ready application to seemingly innocuous or even patriotic items such
as windshield decals, posters, buttons, symbols, slogans, and their fear
that it would encompass "all those reproductions of the face of Presi-
dent John F. Kennedy superimposed upon a picture of the American
flag which hang on the walls of shops, homes, and offices all over
this country."1 70
The court in Hodsdon, said that the casting of the contempt provision
could be read to prohibit gestures or salutes that identify unpopular or
controversial groups, 171 and therefore voided the statute.
Perhaps the most devastating attack on the statute's overbreadth was
made by Judge Craven, who, speaking for the Federal District Court in
North Carolina, said:
The definition of a flag in the North Carolina statute is simply unbe-
lievable. It would doubtless embrace display of the Star of David
against a red, white and blue background. The statute makes plain
that it matters not how many stripes or how many stars. One of each
is enough. This is expropriation of color and design-not flag protec-
tion. Size is of no consequence and substance of no importance. It
is even possible that the stars could be omitted entirely and the colors
alone infringe the statute, for there is a disjunctive clause leaving it
to the subjective determination of any person to believe, without de-
liberation, that a substance or design may represent the flag of the
United States. Read literally, it may be dangerous in North Carolina to
possess anything red, white and blue. Such a definition is a manifest
absurdity. Since it is not suggested that the state has the slightest
167. Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S.
88 (1940).
168. 394 U.S. at 580-81.
169. Commonwealth v. Sgorbati, 49 Pa. D. & C.2d 173 (Ct. Comm. P. 1970);
Commonwealth v. lanoff, 439 Pa. 212, 266 A.2d 657 (1970).
170. Long Island Moratorium Comm. v. Calm, 322 F. Supp. 559 (E.D.N.Y. 1970).
171. 310 F. Supp. at 535.
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interest in singling out from the spectrum certain colors for unique
protection, this definition alone is sufficient to void the statute . 7 2
As long as the statute is open to these interpretations it will be vul-
nerable to the claim that citizens are compelled to guess at its limits,
and that it goes beyond the allowable area of governmental control,
sweeping within its ambit assorted innocent acts. It then becomes the
unenviable task of its enforcers to make the necessary distinctions, rec-
ognizing that a statute challenged under the overbreadth doctrine may
be held invalid "whether or not the record discloses that the petitioner
has engaged in privileged conduct."'173
The vagueness doctrine was raised in the minority report of the
House of Representatives' 74 in 1967, prior to the enactment of the
federal flag desecration law, 18 U.S.C. 700. The federal measure is
patterned after the standard state enactments, but studiously omits con-
tempt by "words." The definition of a flag, which the Parker court
termed "simply unbelievable" is virtually the same in the federal stat-
ute, and indeed, in New York's law, and in most other states as well.
The Senate report rejected any argument as to vagueness, saying that:
The language of the bill prohibits intentional, willful, not accidental
or inadvertent public physical acts of desecration of the flag. Utter-
ances are not proscribed. Specific examples of prohibited conduct
under the bill would include casting contempt upon the flag by burning
or tearing it and by spitting upon or otherwise dirtying it. There is
nothing vague or uncertain about the terms used in the bill.
Of course, nothing in the bill will prohibit any person from complying
with section 1760) title 36, United States Code, which provides that
when the flag "is in such condition that it is no longer a fitting emblem
for display [it] should be destroyed in a dignified way, preferably by
burning." Compliance with this provision obviously does not cast con-
tempt on the flag.
Public burning, destruction, and dishonor of the national emblem in-
flicts an injury on the entire Nation. Its prohibition imposes no substan-
tial burden on anyone. Enactment of this legislation is wholly salu-
tary.175
As for another congressional concern, namely, the danger of un-
172. Parker v. Morgan, 322 F. Supp. 585, 588 (W.D.N.C. 1971).
173. N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432 (1963).
174. H.R. RP. No. 350, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1967).
175. S. REP. No. 1287, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 2509 (1968).
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wittingly pre-empting the states, Halter was viewed by the Attorney
General as authorizing concurrent legislation by federal and state
bodies. 7 6
The Congress believed that state enforcement was adequate but felt
that the matter was of national dimension. The House report, on this
point, reads as follows:
The bill as amended, will assure Federal investigative and prose-
cutive jurisdiction over those who would cast contempt by publicly mu-
tilating, defacing, defiling, burning, or trampling upon the flag of the
United States. It is intended that State jurisdiction in this matter should
not be displaced. Often, the only immediate method of detection and
apprehension of those who desecrate the law may be State and local
police. In other areas, the exercise of Federal jurisdiction may be
critical in the enforcement of the law. The committee is persuaded
that it is in the national interest that concurrent jurisdiction be exercised
by Federal and State law enforcement agencies over this subject. 177
SPEECH, NON-SPEECH, AND SYMBOLIC SPEECH
It has been seen that speech, within the meaning of the first amend-
ment freedoms, includes more than mere verbal or written utterances,
and may include "communicative" acts. Whether the burning of a
flag constitutes symbolic "speech" meriting the security of the first
amendment is a question that the Supreme Court expressly declined to
answer during two most recent opportunities. 178
Federal and state courts have, however, labored over this issue and
it usually lies at the heart of their holdings. The courts, notwith-
standing any direct expression from the high court, have been guided
by several leading cases in analagous situations. Three of these cases
are United States v. O'Brien"69 (draft card burning), Stromberg v. Cali-
fornias° (displaying a red flag), and Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Comm. School Dist.' (students wearing armbands). In each of these
cases, the Supreme Court was dealing with the boundaries of political
dissent through expression that was neither verbal nor written.
176. Id. at 2510.
177. H.R. REP. No. 350, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1967).
178. Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 580-81 (1969). The Court in Radich's ap-
peal had another opportunity, but no decision was written when it affirmed by an
equally divided court. 401 U.S. at 531.
179. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
180. 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
181. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
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Stromberg was arrested in 1930, pursuant to a California statute
that outlawed the display of a red flag as a "symbol or emblem of oppo-
sition to organized government or as an invitation or stimulus to an-
archistic action or as an aid to propaganda that is of a seditious char-
acter." Her "intent" was supplied by the introduction into evidence
of her books, which included communist revolutionary dogma. The
Supreme Court reversed her conviction because the statutory phrase
could be construed to stifle peaceful opposition to government. Thus,
this was one of the first cases in which the Court expanded the phrase
"free speech" to embrace communicative acts. The California court
was equally cognizant of the statute's infirmities, but endeavored to
redeem it, on the ground that it was aimed at conduct designed to pro-
mote revolution with which the red flag was synonymous.
In Tinker, Des Moines School authorities promulgated a regulation
prohibiting, under pain of suspension, any elementary, junior high, or
high school student from wearing an armband to school. This action
was defended on the ground that school authorities feared these "dem-
onstrations" would be disruptive and inimical to the operation of the
school. Three Tinker children, aged eight, eleven, and thirteen, vio-
lated the rule, and the case was carried to the Supreme Court. The
enforcement of the regulation was enjoined by the Court as being ob-
noxious to the first amendment in the absence of any showing by
school administrators that the forbidden conduct would materially in-
terfere with school discipline. Thus, the Court again safeguarded, as
"protected speech", forms of communicative conduct.
But in O'Brien, the majority, rejecting the view that all communi-
cative conduct is protected, held that "when 'speech' and 'non-speech'
elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently
important governmental interest in regulating the non-speech element
can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms."' 82
Thus, in seeking to restrict flag mutilation, what governmental in-
terest would qualify as sufficiently compelling?
O'Brien held that the interest of the government in preserving an
orderly system for selective service is sufficient to justify such an in-
trusion. The decision was not posited on grounds of patriotism or
decorum. The O'Brien governmental interest test is the most com-
monly employed yardstick in measuring the constitutionality of flag
statutes. O'Brien tells us that
182. 391 U.S. at 376.
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a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the con-
stitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or
substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is un-
related to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental re-
striction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is es-
sential to the furtherance of that interest. . 183
The court in Cowgill opted for the second interest as being neces-
sary to prevent public disorder.'84
In Crosson, the court found that the control of the non-speech ele-
ment is not justified by (1) patriotic concerns (2) emotional disap-
proval of the viewers of flag desecrations (3) governmental "prop-
erty" interests in the flag.
There is, the court said, a sufficient interest in avoiding public dis-
orders, 8 5 but because of the statute's overbreadth, the method of pro-
hibiting conduct places a greater burden on protected expression than
is necessary to further the state's interest in averting breaches of the
peace.
Whether Crosson is right or wrong, it is clear that the governmental
interest in punishing "words" is inadequate. The Court in Street,
identified four governmental interests that might be furthered by pun-
ishing Street for his words: (1) an interest in preventing him from
vocally inciting others to commit unlawful acts; (2) an interest in pre-
venting him from uttering words so inflammatory that they would pro-
voke others to retaliate physically against him, causing a breach of the
peace; (3) an interest in protecting the sensibilities of passersby who
might be shocked by Street's words about the American flag; (4) an
interest in assuring that Street, regardless of the impact of his words
on others, showed proper respect for the national symbol. None of
those interests, the Court concluded, could constitutionally justify a
conviction under the statute. 8 6
The Hodsdon court, under the O'Brien test, held that while speech
and non-speech elements are intertwined, the statute strikes where no
interest is served other than expression and is therefore void. 8 7
183. 391 U.S. at 377.
184. People v. Cowgill, 274 Cal. App. 2d 923, 78 Cal. Rptr. 853 (1969).
185. See Loewy, Punishing Flag Desecrators: The Ultimate in Flag Desecration,
48 N.C.L. REv. 48, 78 (1970).
186. See Note, Freedom of Speech and Symbolic Conduct: The Crime of Flag
Desecration, 12 Aiz. L. REV. 72, 77 (1970).
187. See also Hodsdon v. Buckson, 310 F. Supp. 528, 531 (D. Del. 1970) in which
the court hypothesized that a valid statute could be drawn.
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Although the court was unable to determine in Deeds just what the
defendant was trying to communicate, it assumed that he was, by flag
burning, engaging in some form of expression, but held, as did Fergu-
son and Sutherland, that the preservation of the flag as a symbol, and
the interest of public order outweigh his act, however inextricably in-
terwoven it may be with its communicative aspect.
PROCEDURE: APPEAL, INJUNCTION, SEVERENCE, AND THE
DOCTRINE ON FEDERAL ABSTENTION
Most flag law has evolved from decisions on appeals from judgments
of conviction. A defendant is free, on direct appeal to seek review on
constitutional grounds, but the failure to raise the question below may
be held to constitute a waiver.' 88 The Supreme Court has generally
regarded it as immaterial that the record does not show that a constitu-
tional question was raised in the trial court if it appears that the issue
was properly raised before, and decided by, the state court of last re-
sort,1S" but at other times the Supreme Court has held appellants to
stricter standards. In On Lee v. United States, 90 the Court, by way
of dictum, noted that it subscribed to the uniform policy requiring con-
stitutional questions to be raised at the earliest possible stage in the
litigation, but decided the question nonetheless, apparently in reliance
upon earlier writings in which the Court expresed a propensity for
deciding newly raised constitutional issues in "exceptional" cases
only.191
Habeas corpus is suitable, in most jurisdictions, as a vehicle to as-
sail the constitutionality of a statute,'92 as is prohibition, 93 demur-
rer, 4 or an action for declaratory relief. 95
188. E.g., Dodge v. Cornelius, 168 N.Y. 242, 61 N.E. 244 (1901); United States v.
Walton, 411 F.2d 283, 286 (9th Cir. 1969).
189. Whitfield v. Ohio, 297 U.S. 431, 436 (1936).
190. 343 U.S. 747, 749-50 n.3 (1952).
191. See Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 339, 362 n.16, rehearing denied, 355
U.S. 967 (1958).
192. E.g., Ex parte Starr, 263 F. Supp. 145 (D. Mont. 1920); People ex rel. Bat-
tista v. Christian, 249 N.Y. 314, 164 N.E. 111 (1928); In re Wells, 335 P.2d 358
(Okla. 1959); 39 C.J.S. Habeas Corpus § 18 (1944).
193. Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 377 (1879).
194. Chicago & N.W. R.R. v. Fachman, 225 Iowa 989, 125 N.W.2d 210 (1963);
People v. Collozo, 54 Misc. 2d 687 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1967).
195. Bunis v. Conway, 17 App. Div. 2d 207, - N.Y.S.2d -, appeal denied, 17
App. Div. 2d 1036, 247 N.Y.S.2d 134, appeal dismissed, 12 N.Y.2d 883, 188 N.E.2d
260, 237 N.Y.S.2d 993 (1963).
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Under federal procedure, a court may entertain a civil action, pur-
suant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, based on a claim of state deprivation of a
constitutional right.'0 6 Declaratory relief may issue under 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2201 and 2202.1 7  If the requests for relief meet the standards of
28 U.S.C. § 2281 et seq., a three judge court will be convened.
Original jurisdiction is vested in federal district courts, pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1343, in any action to redress a deprivation described in
42 U.S.C. § 1983. In any such action, brought to restrain a state
prosecution, an application for a preliminary injunction must be ad-
dressed to a three judge court; it may not be considered at that stage
by a single judge.'0 8
These statutes must be read in relation to 28 U.S.C. § 2283, the
"anti-injunction statute", which prohibits a United States court from
granting any injunction to stay state court proceedings except as ex-
pressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its
jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.
A troublesome question then arises as to whether 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
the civil rights deprivation statute, falls within any of the exceptions.
Needless to say, the prohibition against enjoining a state prosecution
does not apply to threatened or future state court proceedings. 9
196. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Con-
stitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit
in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
197. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 (1970):
§ 2201. Creation of remedy
In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction, except with respect to
Federal taxes, any court of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate
pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested
party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be
sought. Any such declaration shall have the force and effect of a final
judgment or decree and shall be reviewable as such.
§ 2202. Further relief
Further necessary or proper relief based on a declaratory judgment or de-
cree may be granted, after reaosnable notice and hearing, against any adverse
party whose rights have been determined by such judgment.
198. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281-82 (1970); Hendricks v. Hogan, 324 F. Supp. 1277, 1279
(S.D.N.Y. 1971).
199. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965). But note that the Third
Circuit and the Sixth Circuit have held § 1983 is an express exception to the anti-
injunction statute: Honey v. Goodman, 432 F.2d 333 (6th Cir. 1970); Cooper v.
Hutchinson, 184 F.2d 119 (3d Cir. 1950). While Younger was decided after Honey,
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1972/iss2/1
FLAG DESECRATION STATUTES
The purpose of the anti-injunction statute is to avoid friction be-
tween federal and state courts. It was invoked in Cole v. Graybeal200
in dismissing a petition for an injunction against a pending state pros-
ecution for flag desecration. Other courts have been less chary. In
Crosson the court not only entertained the petition but voided the
statute, and with it, a pending Arizona prosecution. The courts in
Hodsdon and Parker did the same, in nullifying Delaware and North
Carolina pending prosecutions. None of the courts mentioned the
anti-injunction statute. In Long Island, the court was dealing with a
threatened prosecution and was incontestably within its jurisdiction.
The district courts in Sutherland and Ferguson, dealing with pending
prosecutions in Illinois and California, entertained the petitions, despite
(and without mentioning) 28 U.S.C. § 2283, but denied relief
on the merits, upholding the constitutionality of the state statute.
While the courts in Crosson and Ferguson did mention the pro-
priety of assuming jurisdiction, those in Hodsdon, Parker and Suther-
land, while not mentioning the anti-injunction statute, did discuss the
"doctrine of abstention" concluding, in each case, that under the au-
thority of Dombrowski and Zwickler v. Koota,2°' there was ample sup-
port for deciding the issues on the merits. In the light of Younger v.
Harris,"' 2 Samuels v. Mackell,20 Boyle v. Landry,20 4 Bryne v. Kara-
lexis,2 15 and Dyson v. Stein,20 6 all decided on February 23, 1971, the
cases may well have been wrongly decided.
In Younger the Supreme Court held that the unconstitutionality of
a statute, on its face, is not in itself justification for enjoining a pending
state prosecution. The teaching of Younger and its companion cases
is that abstention, rather than intervention is the rule, in the absence
of a combination of extraordinary circumstances amounting to nothing
less than bad faith state efforts to prosecute under a palpably uncon-
stitutional statute. It is not enough to show the sort of injury "asso-
the approach taken by the Sixth Circuit indicates the continued validity of Honey. See
401 U.S. at 62 (Douglas, J. dissenting); Note, The Civil Rights Act of 1871 versus the
Anti-Injunction Statute: The Need for a Federal Forum, 1971 WAsH. U.L.Q. 625.
200. 313 F. Supp. 48 (W.D. Va. 1970).
201. 389 U.S. 241 (1967).
202. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
203. 401 U.S. 66 (1971).
204. 401 U.S. 77 (1971).
205. 401 U.S. 216 (1971).
206. 401 U.S. 200 (1971).
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ciated with the defense of a single prosecution brought in good
faith .... ,,207 The harm must not only be irreparable, but great, im-
mediate, and exclusive of the cost, anxiety, and inconvenience of de-
fending a state prosecution.208
The adjudication of "overbreadth" in Parker would not, under Sam-
uels v. Mackell, be sufficient for federal injunctive or declaratory relief.
In Dyson v. Stein, the Court reversed a district court order which
voided an obscenity statute. The high court held that the criteria for
the injunction (i.e., irreparable injury) were not adequately described.
The courts that voided the statutes did so despite the rule that the
judiciary, short of doing violence to the plain language of the statute,
should indulge every intendment and resolve any reasonable doubt in
favor of the statute's constitutionality. 2 9 Those courts also rejected the
"severence" doctrine, by which they could have separated and invali-
date a portion of the statute, while sustaining the rest. This approach
was specifically rejected in Crosson,210 and at least impliedly in the
other cases.
Younger v. Harris, which mandates a strict application of the doc-
trine of abstention, and Street, in which the United States Supreme
Court itself applied the doctrine of severability, make it reasonably
certain that the high court has tightened the standards for the nulli-
fication, by federal district courts, of proceedings that have not been
subject to state constitutional review.
WHAT IS A FLAG?
The Uniform Flag Act contains provisions prohibiting desecration
of any flag, standard, color, ensign or shield, of any size, "or any rep-
resentation thereof." New York's statute contains the additional words
"upon which shall be shown the colors, the stars, and the stripes in any
number of either thereof." If this means what it says, the statute
would cover objects which no one could conceivably regard as the
national flag. The courts have, therefore, themselves limited the stat-
ute, precluding convictions on the ground that the object in question
was simply not a flag.
207. 401 U.S. 37, 48 (1971).
208. Id. at 46.
209. Long Island Moratorium Comm. v. Calm, 322 F. Supp. 559 (E.D.N.Y. 1970);
Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 344-45 (1970) (concurring opinion).
210. 319 F. Supp. at 1089.
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In Long Island, the district court held that New York's statute did
not apply to defendant's display, a peace symbol emblem superim-
posed on a part of a flag. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals re-
jected this view but affirmed the granting of injunctive relief by voiding
the statute itself, precisely because the statute was so overbroad as to
include the emblem.
In Nicola the North Dakota Supreme Court made the same ruling as
the district court in Long Island, by holding that defendant's superim-
posed peace symbol was not a flag. North Dakota's statute contains
the same broad definition as New York's.
This point troubled at least one member of the Supreme Court, as
seen from the oral argument in Radich. The following exchange took
place between Mr. Justice Marshall and assistant district attorney Mi-
chael Juviler:
Mr. Justice Marshall: "Suppose it was a 48-star flag."
"Yes, that would violate the statute."
"How about a 13-star flag? * * * And when I get through I'm
going to ask you about a 53-star flag."
"I suppose whether this is a contemporary American flag is a ques-
tion of fact * * * and then there would be no First Amendment ques-
tion." 11
Examples even more perplexing arise: Is a national flag, with ham-
mers and sickles in the corner, in place of stars, a defaced American
flag, or is the absence of stars a feature that alters its character as an
American flag?
Considerations of this kind will, no doubt, continue to arise because
of the existence of a statute that was written 70 years ago when the
concept of symbolic speech was beneath the horizon.
The even division of the Supreme Court in Radich bespeaks the
very division of the lower courts in an important constitutional area.
It is submitted that the existing flag laws, most of which are of World
War I vintage, should be re-examined, accompanied by legislative ef-
forts to draft a uniform flag law compatible with the constitutional
considerations described in the case law.
211. Reported in 8 CRM. L.J 4168.
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